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by PETER J. GRIMA* 
without expansion of international trade, based upon fair 
dealing and equal treatment for all, there can be no stability 
and security either within or among nations ••• (Furthermore) 
the withdrawal by a nation (or group of nations) from orderly 
trade with the rest of the world inevitably leads ••• to prepara-
tions for (a military or trade) war and a provocative attitude 
toward other nations.'l 
To what degree the above comment by Secretary of State Cor-
dell Hull in November 1938, represents fundamental convictions 
found in the articulation of United States foreign policy, can best 
be assessed, by justaposing the following excerpt from Republican 
President Nixon's'Report to Congress' on February 9,.1972: 
, •.• some of our trading partners are following certain trade 
policies which adversely affect us ••• Particularly worrisome 
are new preferential trading arrangements ••• which ••• con-
strain worldwide trade opportunities, ••• weaken ••• interna-
tional economic relations and raise the risk of political ten-
sions •• (Such a) retreat by any nation or group of nations in-
to protectionism, or attempts to gain advantage by means of 
nea-mercantilist policies, will deal a severe blow to interna-
tional cooperation which underlies the strength and prosperity 
of all nations.,2 
In the thirty four years which span these statements, the foreign 
role of the U.S. may have subsumed differing salient characteris-
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tics, however I suggest that these are not departures from the ori-
ginal matrix but nuances dictated by the co-temporaneous external 
and internal environments, The difficulty which is raised is one of 
determining, in the flux of politics, whether national security poli-
cy is informed by basic national policy goals, or whether the in-
verse is the case, Perhaps the suggested dichotomy is false, and 
the symbiosis of economic and security goals makes distinctive 
analysis meaningless, In trus case we, can assume that salience of 
security concerns suggests the state of threat to economic aspira-
tions and goals, It follows therefore, that as Kimball suggests, the 
basic goals of American foreign policy are liberalization of world 
trade and the expansion of foreign markets,3 Any real or perceived 
threat or impingement upon these 'basic goals', is reacted to in 
various ways, Le, a role supportive of powers defending these 
goals (Lend-Lease), assumption of leadership role (Truman Doc-
trine and Marshall Plan), containment and confrontation (defense 
alliances), and recently 'Ostpolitik' American Style, Underlying all 
these performances is a preoccupation with domestic prosperity and 
peace, as suggested by a proclivity to 'quid pro quo' in every con-
tribution or oth(~r concession beyond U,S, boundaries, 
Roosevelt's early reaction to war in Europe was that it would 
benefit America economically,4 As Nazi expansiobism became more 
evident, he observed in early 1939; 
" " democracies". cannot safely be indifferent to ". acts 
of aggression, • , (which) automatically undermine all of us. ,5 
Working from this conviction, he set about bringing the U,S, to a 
role supportive of Britain and France. Immediately following the 
outbreak of war in September, he succeeded in getting Congress to 
repeal the arms embargo provision from the 1937 Neutrality Act,6 
The substance of the amendment was to include arms and arma-
ments in the list of war material which the President was empower-
ed to release for sale to belligerent states, against delivery and 
Spot payment in the United States,7 The purpose of the original le-
gislation, to keep America physically out of the war in Europe, did 
not change, True, it was the Western powers which benefitted from 
3 KIMBALL, op, cit. p. 133, 
4 KIMBALL, ibid. p. 239. 
5 ALLEN, H. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORY 
OF ANGLQ-AMERICAN RELATIONS 1783-1952 (New York 1955) p. 778. 
6 ALLEN, ibid. p.795. 
7 KIMBALL, op. cit. p. 238. 
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this amendment, presumably because of Britain's control of the At-
lantic sea-lanes. However, it is premature to suggest that America 
was altering its neutral posture for a committed one, especially 
when one considers the financial difficulties Britain faced through 
shortage of dollars, which were the only means of exchange accept-
ed by the United States. 8 
On his part, Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister was 
eager to obtain full American commitment to Britain's side. One 
month before the fall of France, Churchill sent Roosevelt a cable 
on May 20 1940, the language of which was obviously intended to 
stimulate doubt as to whether U.S. neutralist policies would in fact 
guarantee American interests. In rhetoric of Churchillean depth, the 
communication read; 
( ••• in co conceivable circumstances will we consent to sur-
render. (But) in •.• parley amid the ruins •••. the sole remain-
ing bargaining counter with Germany would be the Fleet, and 
if this country was left by the United States to its fate no one 
would have the right to blame those ••• responsible if they 
made the best terms ••• for the surviving inhabitants.,9 
The implications of a Nazi occupied Britain and a German con-
trolled British fleet at large, are hardly encouraging, militarily or/ 
•••• /economically. The fall of France on June 22, beightened the 
credibility of the quasi-apocalyptic vision painted by Churchill four 
weeks earlier. Within three months of the French collapse, the Unit-
ed States had their first peace-time conscription Act, and the for-
mal alliance of the three Axis powers on September 27, vindicated 
the sharpening of American apprehensions. 10 Earlier, in July 1940 
Roosevelt took a strong position on the question of aid to Britain, 
and arrangements were being considered for the transfer of Ameri-
can warships to the British, in exchange for the lease of Britain's 
Caribbean bases. 11 The deal was executed as a 'quid pro quo'. The 
United States obtaining free use of the naval bases in Newfound-
land and Bermuda, plus 99 year leases on five other British Carib-
bean bases, giving America 'the most important (achievement) •• , 
8Kimball in fact suggests that America's 'neutrality wall' was first 
'pierced'in 1937, when 'cash-and-carry' was first introduced. 
9 ALLEN, op. cit. p.801. 
10 ALLEN, ibid. pp. 806-8. 
11 ALLEN, ibid. pp. 803-4. 
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in the reinforcement of national defense •• .' 12 Churchill's message 
had 'drawn blood,' and the Americans set about shoring up their 
defenses. 
On the question of money, the U.S. was less prone to quick reac-
tion. On May 15, 1940, Churchill communicated to Roosevelt; 
'(Although we) shall go on paying dollars for as long as we 
can .•• I should like to feel reasonably sure that when w~ can 
pay no more (in your currency) you will give us the stuff all 
the same.'13 
In fact the British government was constrained by desperate ur-
gency to forget the notion of conserving dollar assets, hoping that 
a solution to the momentarily less vital problem of finance would 
appear. 14 Instead, pressures for Britain to divest herself of her 
American economic interests increased, and even though little was 
accomplished in this direction, the pressures •• /did not subside 
until the 'quid pro quo' debate surrounding Lend-Lease diverted 
attentions. 15 Reacting to the British asset debate in the United 
States, Churchill, in outlining to Rcosevelt on December 8, ' ••• 
the various ways in which the United States could give supreme 
and decisive help to ••• the common cause •• .' warned that; 
, ... it would be wrong in principle and mutually disadvantag-
eous in effect if Great Britain were to be divested of all sale-
able assets ••• so that ••• (w) e should be unable, after the 
war, to purchase the large balance of imports from the United 
States over and above the volume of our exports which is ag-
reeable to your tariffs and industrial economy ••• ' 16 
Such a situation would almost guarantee the continuation and 
possibly extension of descriminatory trade practices. During the 
Lend-Lease negotiations the following year, Keynes confirmed 
Churchill's warning by indicating in no uncertain terms that Bri-
tain's grave postwar economic situation might oblige he~ to enter 
bi-lateral arrangements, which could very probably work against 
United States interests. 17 
12Roosevelt, quoted in ALLEN ibid. p.808; vide also ROOSEVEL T'S FO-
REIGN POLICY 1933-41, Unedited Speeches and Messages (New York 
1942) pp. 273-6; KIMBALL op. cit. p. 243. 
13Churchill, quoted in ALLEN, op. cit. p.807. 
14ALLEN, ibid. p.808. 
15 AUEN, ibid. KIMBALL, op. cit. pp. 240-1. 
16CllUfchill, quoted in ALLEN op. cit. p. 809. 
17 GARDNER, R. STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY (New York 1966) PP. 
32, 41-2. 
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Roosevelt was obviously aware of the consequences to American 
prosperity, of a Britain where Imperial Preference was compounded 
with barter trading. At a press conference in Washington on Decem-
ber 17, 1940, he articulated these concerns in broad terms, declar-
ing that; 
'(There) is absolutely no doubt in the mind of a very over-
whelming number of Americans that the best immediate defence 
of the United/ ••• /States is the success of Britain defending 
itself.'l8 
It is also conceivable, that when he gave his famous' Arsenal of 
Democracy' speech towards the end of the month, Roosevelt's 
choice of analogy, in comparing the current grave situation to the 
earlier economic crisis, was not fortuitous, but intended to presage 
disastrous consequences to America's post-war economy if support 
of Britain remained pusillanimous and overly concerned with short-
term returns. Certainly the following excerpts from that famous 
'fireside chat' tend to support the hypothesis: 
'We know now that a nation can have peace with the Nazis on-
ly at the price of total surrender ••• Such a dictated peace ••• 
would be only another armistice, leading to the most gigantic 
armament race and the most devastating trade wars in history 
• •• Thinking in terms of today and tomorrow ••• there is far 
less chance of the United States getting into war if we do all 
we can now to support the nations defending themselves 
against ••• the Axis •.• (Clearly) the course I advocate in-
volves the least risk now and. the greatest h ope for world 
peace in the future.' 19 
One can almost extrapolate the suggestion that - 'peace dove-
tails with unhampered trade', which is a Hullean aphorism in re-
verse order - 'unhampered trade dovetail (s) with peace'. 20 Whilst 
one should not discount the speaker'S conviction in the ideological 
content of his appeal, the 'nub' of the matter is articulated by Ro-
osevelt in the introduction to his 'chat', as; 
, ••• th ~ whole purpose of your President is to keep you ••• 
out of ••• war for the preservation/ •• ./(and enjoyment) of all 
18 Roosevelt, quoted in ALLEN op. cit. p.809. 
19 IWOSEVEL T'S FOREIGN POLICY cit. pp. 314-5. 
:ZOCongressman Cordell Hull during the Great War,. quoted in GARDNER oP. 
cit. p. 9. 
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things that American independence means •• .'21 
By definition, it is also the purpose of the President to defend 
the fruits of American independence - peace and prosperity, by 
whatever means are least costly in the long run, and most expe-
dient under the cirsumstances. To refuse this conclusion is to sug-
gest contradiction at least. 
What followed this growing American awareness, that appease-
ment, of Hitler and his cohorts, however manifested, must produce 
negative returns, was Lend-Lease. The Bill, H. R. 1776 entitled 
'An Act Further to Promote the Defence of the United States', was 
introduced early in 1941 and signed into law by Roosevelt on March 
11, Churchill initially described it as 'the most un sordid act in the 
history of any nation'. What the Act did was enable the President, 
'to dispose of (among other things) ••• any defense article ••• 
(and) defense information' to any foreign government whose defense 
was considered vital to the security of the United States, the only 
limitation on the President's jurisdiction being that funds So allo-
cated depended upon the approval of Congress.23 Swept away were 
all legal and financial obstacles to aiding Britain, or any other fo-
reign state whose defense was necessary for the goals of the Unit-
ed States. The assurance that United States aid would not cease, 
as long as the recipient state could resist, was institutionalized. 24 
By September 18, 1941 the first appropriation of 7 billion dollars 
had been almost totally utilized, and a further 6 billion requested. 25 
Following the enactment of Bill H.R. 1776, Roosevelt articulat-
ed his country's philosophy on the occasion of Foreign Trade 
Week, and presaged the future world leadership role of the United 
States. In unequivocal terms he declared; 
' ••• aggression menaces not only our foreign trade and our na-
tional business prosperity ••• (but) circumscribe (s) the area 
within which the principles upon which we base our interna-
tional commercial relations can operate. International com-
merce in a world dominated by totalitarianism would never be 
carried on for the mutual benefit of all. It would be ••• con-
2lROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN POLICY cit. Pp. 310-1. 
22 KIMBALL THE MOST UNSORDID ACT, LEND LEASE 1939-41 (Palti-
more 1969) pp. 80-3. 
23ROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN POLICY cit. Pp. 340-2 'Text'. 
24ROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN POLICY ibid. PP.342-7, World Broadcast 
March 15, 1941. 
25 ROOSEVEL T'S FOREIGN POLICY ibid. pp. 351-69, 494. 
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trolled for the ••• advantage of THOSE NATIONS WHICH 
HAVE ALREADY DECLARED THEIR DETERMINATION •.• 
TO SUBORDINATE TO THEIR OWN PROFIT THE WELFARE 
OF '" OTHE R PEOPLES. Therefore it is idle ••• to talk of 
future foreign trade unless we are ready ••• to defend the 
principles upon which it must be based ••• FAIR TERMS UN-
DER DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES ... (A)fter the emergency 
••• (we) must continue (this) leadership in the preservation 
and promotion of liberal economic policies ••. (and to) fulfill 
••. (our) responsibility in rebuilding ••• a world economy from 
the chaos into which it has been plunged by destructive trade 
restrictions ••• ,26 
Without underestimating the choice of argument as being made 
for the specific interest of the audience, the interpenetration of 
ideological and economic concerns, is similar enough to rhetoric 
directed at other audiences to make one wonder how much of the 
discourse is specifically directed. Also, whether it is not more 
likely that there is little unintended in the broader message, which 
emerges to indict all restraints on liberal trading practices, irres-
pective of their cause or source, outside the United States. Clear-
ly, the Roosevelt Administration's persistent concern with prepar-
ing a Master Lend-Lease agreement which would ensure that 'Bri-
tain eliminate (d) her discriminatory trade practices in return for 
lend-Iease',27 and the President's 'unequivocal' refusal to commit 
himself on the issue of cancelling Lend-Lease debts/8 argue in 
favour of the 'basic goals' theory, within which ideological and 
strategic behaviours become ancillary to overall purposes. Cc:rtain-
ly this view helps explain also, why the United States, in formuliz-
ing an Anglo-American entente in the Atlantic Charter, without 
physically committing tr06ps to aid Britain, attempted to include a 
provision against discriminatory trade practices. 29 A meeting of 
representatives from six U.S. Departments and Agencies concluded 
that the Lend-Lease Act would be a 'dominant factor' in United 
States trade with the British Empire,30 and as the U.S. Ambassador 
26 ROOSEVEL T'S FOREIGN POLICY ibid. PP. 387-8, emphasis added. 
27 KIMBALL, 'Lend-Lease and the Open Door ••• ' op. cit. pp. 248-9. 
2SHERRING, G. 'The United States and British Bankruptcy 1944-45' in PO-
LITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY cit. p.264. 
29 KIMBALL, 'Lend-Lease and the Open Door ••• ' pp. 250-2 ALLEN, op. c it. 
PP. 823-4 GARDNER, op. eit. pp. 42-53. 
30 Memo from Stettinius to Hull, quoted in KIMBALL op. elt. PP. 251-2 vide 
also fn. 46. 
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in London suggested; 
, ••• there would probably be no better time to press the issue 
(of trade liberalization). ,31 
The Department of State's chief of Commercial Treaties direct-
ed; 
'Our objective should be to use the lend-lease agreement to 
obtain commitments of real value to us.' 
He then proceeded to advise mutual dismantlement of bilateral 
trade systems, and the abolishm"ent of the Ottawa Agreement by the 
British. 32 To convince the American people and Congress that 
Lend-Lease aid would not be used to compete with the United 
States in export markets, Britain even issued a White Paper in 
September 1941, confirming good faith. 33 However, British 'balking' 
at the wording of the American draft of the Master Lend-Lease ag-
reement, produced no substantive concessions, and whilst Britain 
was directed to dispense with all discriminatory trade practices, 
'the State Departments merely genuflected toward/ •• ./tariff reduc-
tion, certain that Congress would have the last say.,34 
Nothing in the letter and intent of the Lend-Lease Act suggests 
even a mild ideological caveat. There is the broadest scope for 
pragmatism in Presidential decisions to supply foreign countries 
'in the interests of national defense (and welfare)'. Perhaps the 
most significant measure of this pragmatism was evidenced in the 
decision to help Russia, following the German invasion in June 
1941. On /.ugust 2, the State Department informed the Russian Am-
bassador that the United States government had 'decided to give 
all economic assistance ••• (to) strengthen ( ••• ) the Soviet Union' 
against Nazi aggression. 35 An 'afterthought' attempt in Congress on 
October 7, 1941 to amend the Lend-Lease Act to 'prohibit the use 
31KIMBALL, 'Lend-Lease and the Open Door •• .' pp.252 John Win ant to 
Secretary of State Sept. 30/1941. 
32Hawkins to Dean Acheson Oct. ·10/1941, quoted in KIMBALL 'Lend-
Lease and ••• • p.252. 
NOTE: The Imperial Preference system set up under the 1932 Ottawa Ag-
reement gave Britain a stronger position in Commonwealth markets. In re-
turn, Britain accepted a larger volume of exports from Commonwealth 
countries. Vide P. BAGNELL & G. MINGAY Britain and America 1850-1939, 
A Study of Economic Change (London 1970) p.296. 
33 KIMBALL, 'Lend-Lease and •• .' pp. 250-2 ALLEN, op. cit. p. S 12. 
34 KIMBALL, 'Lend-Lease and ... ' pp. 253-4. 
35 ROOSEVEL T' S FOREIGN POLICY cit. pp. 448-9. 
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of ••• it's funds for loans to the Soviet Union' was clearly defeat-
ed.36 Reinvoking the more rem ore past, in 1911 Theodore Roosevelt 
put the spirit of American foreign policy very succinctly when he 
observed; 
'If Great Britain failed •.• the United States would have to 
step in ••• to re-establish the balance of power in Europe, ne-
ver mind against (or in favour of) which country, or group of 
countries, our efforts may have to be directed ••• In fact, we 
are ourselves becoming, owing to our strength and geographi-
cal situation, more and more the balance of power of the whole 
globe.'37 
One might add that America's external performance, at least 
since the late thirties, has followed this adage rather closely. 
Clearly, a rational belief in or adherence to 'basic goals', requires 
an artention to certain prerequisites such as the prevention of he-
gemony by maintaining a 'balance of power' in all international re-
lationships. Certainly nothing which we have looked at thus far, 
and which we shall consider later, suggests that the United States 
has diverged from concerning itself with achieving the prerequisites 
which will protect and guarantee its 'basic goals'. To suggest with 
Herring,38 that the manifestation of concern for post-war economic 
issues merely reflects the antics of an Administration, contending 
with the vagaries of a legislative branch 'recovering' slowly from 
isolationism under persistent constituent pressures, is simply to 
state the obvious techricalities and miss completely the execution 
of the overall purposes of American foreign policy. To disagree 
with the focus of Herring et. al. is not to ignore the picture which 
emerges from this critical period, of professional politicians, 
whose better informed perceptions of the prerequisites necessary, 
necessitate their manipulation of the political mechanisms to ar-
rive at the mutually desired 'basic goals'. But men such as Presi-
dent Roosevelt, were clearly more than able politicians, in attempt-
ing to forestall agression in Europe, and ultimately undertaking to 
ensure the maintenance of a 'balance of force' to prevent hegemo-
ny. Their action in this direction must also flow from sources other 
than pedestrian politics. 
With RooseveIt's death in April 1945, and the coming of the Tru-
36 WESTER FIELD, H. FOREIGN POLICY AND PARTY POLITICS: PEARL 
HARBOR TO KORMA ( New Haven 1955). 
37 Quoted in ALLEN op. cit. p. 688. 
38 HERRING, op. ci:. p. 261. 
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man administration, it has been suggested that United States fo-
reign policy changes direction. The neophyte President shows 
greater susceptibility to Congressional pressures, and cancels the 
Lend-Lease programme. Congress was growing wary that Lend-
Lease might be used to commit the United States to a post-war po-
licy in a manner contrary to 'established constitutional procedure', 
probably because the administration of the Act had been consider-
ed 'wasteful'.39 Truman's concern to keep 'faith' with Congress is 
as much a matter of expediency as of conviction. Perhaps not to 
his credit, the President was overly impressed with power dimen-
sions implicit in exclusive nuclear capabilities. However, there 
are indications that this reaction was not lasting. Certainly the 
Truman Doctrine and the Marshal! Plan demonstrated an awareness 
and concern, 'that the existing (disastrous) economic situation in 
Europe endangered the general welfare and national interest of the 
'United States. 40 . The magnitude of the European economic crisis 
can be gauged from the situation of Britain. Estimates in 1944 
showed that British post-war debts would bring her an annual defi-
cit of one billion Sterling during the first three post-war years. 41 
But in the light of Congressional opinion, a British request in the 
summer of 1944, for an extension of Lend-Lease 'to facilitate ••• 
recovery' of exports, found no support in America. 42 In fact Roose-
velc's Administration held out little hope of convincing Congress 
at the time, to undertake even a 'modest' foreign aid programme. 43 
Softening on his commitment for Phase II of Lend-Lease, under 
which Britain would have received $2.8 billion in munitions and 
$2.6 billion in non-munitions, Roosevelt stressed the rationale of 
domestic political pressures.44 In fact by March 1945, Congress 
was fully determined to put the economic 'screws' on the Execu-
tive Branch and hold it to 'strict accountability for it's acts'. 45 
Diffident of Roosevelt's undertaking to end Lend-Lease when hos-
tilities ended, Congress legislated, in March, a circumscribed in-
3iJ YOUNG, R. CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
(N ew York 1956) pp. ~80-4. 
40 Quoted in VAN DER BEUGEL, E., FROM MARSHALL AID TO ATLANTIC 
PARTNERSHIP (Amsterdam 1966) p.117, 1947, Administration's First 
Draft of Foreign Assistance Act (1948). 
41HERRING, op. cit. p. 261. 
42 HERRING, ibid. p. 263. 
43 HERRING, ibid. p. 264. 
44HERRING, ibid. p.269. 
45 HERRING, ibid. p.271. 
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terpretation of Lend-Lease which required 'that any supplies after 
the war ended or that did not contribute directly to operations must 
be paid for in cash. ,46 Truman, in acting consonantly with Con-
gress, reflected a concern for broader implications of a resurgence 
of isolationism,47 with attendant repercussions upon world peace 
and prosperity (not excluding the United States). 
Before the Yalta Conference, in February 1945 a State Depart-
ment position paper stated; 
'It now seems clear that the Soviet Union will exert predomi-
nant political influence over (certain) areas in question. While 
this Government probably would not want to oppose such a 
(pro-Russian) political configuration, neither would it desire 
to see American influence in this part of the world nullified,.48 
Although presaging the Cold War and Containment, this is also a 
restatement of United States desire to maintain a 'balance of power' 
whilst accepting the principle of spheres of influence. Despite the 
obvious political-ideological cleavage, international cooperation 
still underlies all policy. Truman's 'message to the nation' in Jan-
uary 1947, in fact emphasized that the fundamental interests of the 
Soviet Union and the United States depended on world order, with-
out which the process of reconstruction was seriously handicap-
ped. 49 It was Kennan, U.S. Charges d' Affaires in Moscow, who, an-
ticipating Churchill's famous 'iron curtain' speech, articulated the 
rationale for the imminent American policy of containment. In a 
communication to the Department of State he analyzed the funda-
mentals of Russian ambitions, and warned; 
, • •. no :.>ne should underrate the importance of the Marxist 
doctrine in practical Russian policy ••• This pol;tical force 
has complete power of disposition over the energies of one of 
the world's greatest peoples and the resources of the world's 
richest national territory •• • 1 . . . IIt is seemingly inaccessible 
to considerations of reality ••• For it, the vast fund of objec-
tive fact about human society is not ••• the measure against 
which outlook is constantly ••• tested and reformed, but a 
great grab bag from which individual items are selected arbit-
rarily and tendentiosly to bolster an outlook already precon-
~6HERRING, ibid. pp.271-2. 
'''HERRING, ibid. p.273. 
48YAN DER BEUGEL, Ope cit. p. 15. 
49USDOS Bulletin Y. xvi Tanuary 19, 1947. 
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ceived. 'so 
Elsewhere he decries Soviet expansionary proclivities as; 
t ••• a flIJ11.l stream which moves constantly, WHEREVER IT IS 
PERMITTED TO MOVE •• -'u 
From such a subjective scenario there emerged the Truman Doc-
trine, promising to support 'free peoples who are resisting attempt-
ed subjugation by armed minorities or by OUTSIDE PRESSURES'. 52 
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Clayton, hit 
the heart of the matter in a memorandum issued in January 1947, 
following a visit to Europe, in which he observed; 
'The reins of leadership are slipping from Britain's hands. 
They will be picked up by the United States or by Russia. If 
by Russia, then the BALANCE OF WORLD POWER will turn 
against America ••• ,53 
In the light of such a leitmotif, one can better appreciate the he-
gemonic apprehensions implicit in a statement by Secretary of 
State Marshal! in June, to the effect that; 
, ••• Europe's requirements. ',' are so much greater than ••• 
her ability to pay that she must have substantial (U.S.) ••. 
help, or face economic social and political deterioration ••• 
the consequences (of which)/ •• ./to the economy of the United 
States should be apparent to all •• .'54 
Like Clayton had done earlier in the year, Marshall proceeded to 
advocate that the best way to meet this European economic chal-
lenge of global implications, was to undertake a massive assis-
tance programme. 
The record of the Truman years shows that the warning was well 
heeded. From the Truman Doctrine through the European Recovery 
Programme of the Marshall Plan, the evidence is clearly suggestive 
that United States foreign policy in containing Soviet expansion to-
wards hegemony, was a product of 'basic' concerns for world eco-
nomic recovery, without which liberalization of trade remained an 
academic concept. In May 1947, Secretary of State Acheson ob-
50 Quoted in ALLEN op. c it. p.894. 
51 Quoted in ALLEN ibid •• from Q. Rovere & A. Schlesinger 'The General 
and the President and the Future of American Foteign Policy (New York 
1951) p. 235, emphasis added. 
52Quoted in ALLEN ibid. p.896, emphasis added. 
53 Excerpted from a 'summary' in GARDNER op. cit. p. 300. 
54Quoted in ALLEN op. cit. p. 897. 
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served that; 
'It is generally agreed that until the various countries of the 
world ••• become self-supporting there can be no political or 
economic stability in the world and no lasting peace or pros-
perity for any of US.,55 
The language, and probably the intent, is certainly reminiscent 
of Hullean convictions which equated prosperity and peace as the 
products of political stability and rational economic policies in a 
healthy economy. 
To answer the question whether American policy really took the 
long view, and prepared for a world of healthy national economies 
where liberal trading practices prevailed, one can consider United 
States efforts in the projected International Trade Organization. At 
the I. T.O. discussions in Geneva, as elsewhere, the American po-
licy was unequivocal in intent - 'to wreck beyond hope of repair' 
the British Imperial Preference system, and to block the emergence 
of any other type of discriminatory trading practice. 56 Clearly, 
there is little validity in offering political tactics as substitutes 
for 'basic goal' manoeuvres, which one can submit remained con-
sistent. 
In the light of the work of the Truman Administration, in the area 
of economic aid, the efforts towards European integration symboliz-
ed in attempts to set up the European Defence Community, and the 
policy of containing Soviet expansion (most notably in Berlin and 
Korea), the Eisenhower-Dulles are brought no departure from the 
'basic goals' perspective, and little if any change in tactics. Re-
acting to the rejection of the European Defence Community Treaty, 
and pressing for ultimate European cooperation, Dulles issued a 
joint communique with the German Federal Chancellor from Bonn in 
September 1954, which read; 
• ••• there was complete agreement that European integration 
was so vital to peace and security that efforts to achieve it 
should be resolutely pursued and ••• not •.• abandoned be-
cause of a single setback. '57 
Two days earlier, Dulles had already informed Anthony Eden 
that; 
, ••• it 'Vas immaterial ••• (which system) ••• was better or 
55 Quoted in GARDNER Ope cit. p.301, from USDOS Bulletin xvi (1947) p.992. 
56 Vide GARDNER ibid. p. 349. 
57 Quoted in Van Der Beugel Ope C it. p. 307. 
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worse than EDC ••• as the means of uniting Europe ••• (to) 
stand ( ••• ) on its own feet without American help •• .'58 
Explicit in these statements is the American view that strategic 
concerns for the emancipation of Europe have decidedly broader 
economic purposes. One can hardly escape the inference that the 
political and ecor:omic soundness of Europe are indi visible in Unit-
ed States perspectives, and this climate in Europe (as globally) is 
most desirable for American peace and prosperity. 
President Kennedy's concept of partnership with the economical-
ly and politically sound Western Europe, was a natural corollary to 
prior American concerns for some form 0 f European 'unity'. In J an-
uary 1962, Kennedy proposed legislation to Congress; 
, ••• to 'OIelcome a single partner (E.E.C.) ••• no longer divid-
ed and dependent ••• to share with us the responsibilities and 
initiatives of a free world ••• TO FURTHER SHIFT THE 
WORLD BALANCE OF POWER TO THE SIDE OF FREEDOM 
(AND FREE TRADE) •• .'59 
This Trade Expansion Act passed both House and Senate by very 
decisive bipartisan majorities. 50 Perhaps the President was prema-
ture in his design, since Europe did not yet include Britain. Bri-
tain's accession to the Community was taken into account in Ken-
nedy's emphasis of the point of a collaboration of equals, guaran-
tesing strong relationships, and sharing 'the great ••• tasks of 
building and defending a community of free nations.,51 Clearly, the 
'sine qua non' of this 'grand design' never did materialize. De-
Gaulle not only blocked Britain's entry into the Common Market, 
but consistently refused even to 'genuflect' to the notion of Euro-
pean political union. 62 Perhaps the French President did not share 
Kennedy's vision of an Atlantic partnership underpinned by two 
equal economic, political, military 'pillars', even if France formed 
the 'capitellum' on one. It is conceivable also that President Ken-
nedy was looking for an affluent partner to subsidize American glo-
bal defense commitments,63 which DeGaulleprobably perceived 
clearly were ancillary to American 'basic goals' rather than condi-
58 Quoted in Van Der Beugel op. dt. p.308. 
59 Quoted in Van Der BEUGEL ibid. p.371, emphasis added. 
60VAN DER BEUGEL, ibid. p. 372; House 298 to 125, Senate 78 to 8. 
61VAN DER BEUGEL, ibid. pp. 373-4. 
62VAN DER BEUGEL, ibid. pp. 376-85. 
63Vide, B.COHEN ·U.S. Foreign Economic Policy' in ORalS v.XV Spring 
1971 pp. 232-46. 
14 
tioned by the views and needs of foreign 'friendly' states. 
Kennedy's prescriptions for the 'Free World' were not strikingly 
successful. The Kennedy Round negotiations did substantially low-
er tariff barriers on trade, but they did not stem the inward orienta-
tion of the E.E.C. (or Japan), nor the expanding parameters of pre-
ferential trading arrangements of the Economic Community, so that 
the 1970s witnessed America's economic and political proteges 
blossoming into economic giants 'effectively challeng (ing) Ameri-
can leadership in world economic affairs. '64 Cohen suggests that 
the United States, when playing the role of 'central banker for the 
world', was less than discrete in adopting a balance of payments 
policy based upon its own priorities, and in consequence the dollar 
'glut' of the late 1950s developed into the 1968 'run on the bank' to 
trade dollars for gold, which culminated in the decontrol of the pri-
vate gold market.65 This 'denouement' put the United States in a 
paradoxical position, unable to trade gold for dollars it was allow-
ed to maintain its world central bank role, but only because there 
was no 'dumping' of the dollar, with the corollary that new Ameri-
can foreign endeavours cannot with economic safety counter the 
expectations of supporting economies. 66 The emerging reality is a 
militarily powerful United States, whose economic vulnerability 
greatly circumscribes its freedom of action. 
In this perspective the Nixon-Kissinger demarche (sic), not only 
loses its elan, but emerged as the classical crusade for the 'basic 
goals' of peace and 'unhampered trade' by way of the preordained 
(under the economic realities) and not unknown tactic of expanding 
the circle of friendship, to cultivate alternative markets and guard 
against a hegemony (of whatever nature) that threatened the funda-
mental aspirations of America. The fact that the Nixon-Kissinger 
team was 'pioneering' an opening to the East, was in no small mea-
sure due to the fact that America's 'supporting economies' had, for 
some years at least, adhered to a similar attitude as the best 
means of relaxing world tensions. In this light, Nixonian reitera-
tions of faith to pre-existing treaty commitments must be consider-
ed as so much recorded thunder. Wood puts it succinctly in the fol-
lowing passage; 
'The Military Assistance Program, since its inception (with 
Lend-Lease and more specifically with the 1947 $400 million 
604 COHEN, ibid. pp. 237-8. 
65COHEN, ibid. pp.235, 244. 
66COHEN, ibid. p.245. 
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appropriation in aid of Greece and Turkey, has been supported 
by every American President. (But) Congress has not changed 
the statutory MAP mission with its emphasis on promoting "the 
••• security and general welfare of the United States",67 
What is perhaps surprising, is that the extent of the opposition 
to American policies in Vietnam did not bring the freedom of Exe-
cutive action to its nadir. 
The basic thread that runs through the variegated fabric of Unit-
ed States foreign policy is one of concern for a prosperous peace, 
at least for the period examined. The elements of this concern were 
the ensuring of non-discriminatoty trade practices by foreign states, 
and the prevention of development of a foreign hegemony contain-
ing proclivities to set up restrictive trade practices. Never are the 
domestic and external political tactics abstruse enough for one to 
lose sight of the purpose to which they are ancillary. United States 
dislike of the British restrictive trade system was, if anything, 
more frequently and clearly articulated than the apprehension of 
the implications of an Axis victory for American peace and prospe-
rity. As Soviet hegemonic designs became more evident in the 
American mind, wartime assistance and cooperation against poten-
tial restrictions of Nazi hegemony deteriorated into a policy of hos-
tile containment. The vigour with which ALL restrictive trade sys-
tems were opposed by the United States in the various internation-
al discussions (ITO, GATT) during a time when ideological (sic) 
confrontation was institutionalized in the Cold War, presaged the 
'Ostpolitik' American Style, and gives Cordell Hull's observation 
the validation of an adage. Some remarks by Nixon's Secretary of 
the Treasury Connally take in the contemporary scenario as seen 
through the eyes of a United States policy-maker; 
, ••• the essential underpinnings of (the post-war world) ' •• 
(are) gone ••• The developments of (recent years) ••• (indicat-
ed) that the industrial nations were hurtling toward a time of 
tensjon and (economic) paralysis ••• Under such a climate ••• 
works of peace and accord between ••• East and West ••• 
(and) liberality in trading relations between industrial nations 
(are almost impossible). Such a climate ••• give(s) impetus to 
protectionism, parochialism, and the ultimate folly of econo-
mic isolationism ••• In these times, as much as in all times 
past, traders are destined to succeed, where soldiers and dip-
67WOOD, R. 'Military Assistance and the Nixon Doctrine' in ORBlS cit. 
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lomats 68 could not ••• at weaving the countries and continents 
••. into one world ••. (T)he commitment of the United States 
to ••• liberal trade ••• is UNCHANGED and UNCHANGE-
ABLE •• :69 
Flanked by two economically equal 'giants' - Europe and Japan, 
both controlling and questioning American economic leadership, the 
United States best remaining 'bargaining counter' was her mili tary 
power born of past and potential economic might. The Nixon-Kis-
singer programme seemed to be wanting to prevent the development 
of a Japan-Europe economic 'axis', the hegemony of which has de-
monstrated the ability and proclivity to 'choke' most opportunities 
for American initiative. By extending the cooperative horizons of 
the United States, the Nixon-Kissinger team demonstrated distinct-
ly traditional pragmatic American approaches in coming to grips 
with basic economic concerns. Conceivably also, what was being 
attempted was a balancing of economic power, by giving promi-
nence to the inherent wealth of numerical size and military capabi-
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